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I study how the general and specic details of a micro founded monetary framework
aect the determination of policy when the government has limited commitment. The
conduct of policy depends on the interaction between the incentive to smooth distortions
intertemporally and a time-consistency problem. In equilibrium, scal and monetary policies
are distortionary, but long-run policy is not aicted by time-consistency problems. Policy
variables in specic applications of the general framework react similarly to variations in
fundamentals. Nevertheless, resolving certain environment frictions aect long-run policy
signicantly. The response of government policy to aggregate shocks is qualitatively similar
across the studied model variants. However, there are signicant quantitative dierences in
the response of government policy to productivity shocks, mainly due to the idiosyncratic
behavior of the money demand. Environments with no trading frictions display the best 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to post-war U.S. data.
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11 Introduction
Monetary theorists have long stressed the importance of analyzing monetary policy in the
context of environments that have an explicit, micro founded role for money (e.g., see Wallace,
1998, 2001 and Williamson and Wright, 2010 for recent expositions). Following the work by
Kocherlakota (1998), it is agreed that these environments should feature a double coincidence of
wants problem, imperfect record keeping and limited commitment. Beyond this set of minimal
frictions, there does not appear to be any guide as to which other details or frictions we should
attribute to articial economies when studying government policy. For example, do we assume
competitive markets or bilateral meetings? Do we allow for nancial intermediation?
Due to the interaction between scal and monetary policies, it seems reasonable to expect
that the specic details of a monetary economy may alter our analysis and conclusions regard-
ing the (endogenous) determination of government actions.1 However, it is not immediately
apparent which results are altered by the idiosyncratic properties of a monetary environment
and whether these eects, if present, are quantitatively signicant.
In this paper, I analyze how the general and specic details of micro founded monetary
economies aect the determination of government policy, both in the long-run and in response
to aggregate shocks. To this end, I study policy within the monetary framework proposed by
Lagos and Wright (2005), with the addition of a benevolent government that cannot commit
to future policy choices and uses money, nominal bonds and distortionary taxes to nance the
provision of a valued public good. As shown in Martin (2009, 2011b), limited commitment
on the part of the government provides a mechanism that explains the level of debt and, by
extension, other policy variables.
I begin the analysis by deriving the theoretical properties of government policy with limited
commitment in a general monetary framework, which extends the ndings in Martin (2011b).
In this class of environments, the classic incentive to smooth distortions intertemporally (as
in Barro, 1979 and Lucas and Stokey, 1983) is weighted against a time-consistency problem
created by the interaction between debt and monetary policy. How much debt the government
inherits aects its monetary policy since in
ation reduces the real value of nominal liabilities. In
turn, the anticipated response of future monetary policy aects the current demand for money
and bonds, and thereby how the government today internalizes policy trade-os.
Assuming initial net nominal liabilities (money plus bonds) are non-negative, the following
results hold in the general framework.2 First, the government always chooses to carry-over
strictly positive net nominal liabilities. Second, both scal and monetary policies are distor-
tionary. In particular, the government never implements the Friedman rule of zero nominal in-
terest rates. Third, despite these properties, long-run policy is not aicted by time-consistency
problems: assuming no aggregate uncertainty, endowing a government at the steady state with
a commitment technology would have no eect on policy.
Next, I consider three specic variants of the underlying monetary economy: \competitive
markets", assumes all markets are perfectly competitive; \nancial intermediation", assumes
the existence of a technology that records nancial (but not goods) transactions, which allows
for the intermediation of at money, as in Berentsen et al. (2007); and \trading frictions", as-
sumes decentralized exchange in some markets and introduces an ineciency due to bargaining
1The link between scal and monetary policy is both theoretically and empirically relevant. Ohanian (1998)
provides a thorough historical account for the U.S. economy. Sargent and Wallace (1981) rst showed how the
eects of monetary policy are aected by a given scal policy. Lucas (1986) famously postulated a set of principles
for optimal scal and monetary policy. See Martin (2009) and Martin (2011b) for further discussion in the context
of environments with limited commitment.
2See Martin (2011b) for a characterization of policy when initial net nominal liabilities are negative, in a
specic application of the framework studied here.
2over the terms of trade. The set of model variants considered here, although not exhaustive, is
fairly representative of the type of micro founded monetary economies we would adopt to study
the determination of government policy. The three environments only dier in the number
of frictions that are present. The case with nancial intermediation has only those frictions
necessary to make a medium of exchange essential, as enumerated above; the case with compet-
itive markets adds a nancial friction which precludes the intermediation of at money in some
markets; nally, the case with trading frictions features both nancial and trading frictions.
I nd that the response of long-run policy variables to permanent changes in fundamentals is
largely similar across environments, both qualitatively and quantitatively. However, the eects
of frictions is quantitatively signicant. Specically, resolving trading frictions implies higher
long-run debt and in
ation, whereas resolving nancial frictions has the opposite eect.
To evaluate the response of government policy to aggregate shocks, I consider two sources
of aggregate 
uctuations at annual frequencies: shocks to the marginal value of the public
good (\expenditure" shocks) and shocks to the productivity of labor. The simulated economies
match basic time-series properties of the post-war U.S. economy. The policy response to aggre-
gate shocks is qualitatively similar in the three variants considered. However, there are some
signicant quantitative dierences in the response of debt and in
ation to productivity shocks.
To further compare the three environments and assess their relative empirical plausibility,
I evaluate their implications along three dimensions: the persistence of policy variables; the
relationship between the nominal interest rate and velocity of circulation (i.e., the money de-
mand function); and the relationship between in
ation and GDP (i.e., the Phillips curve). For
all three tests, the case with competitive markets provides the best t to the data, while the
variant with trading frictions features the worse t. The dierence in performance across en-
vironments stems mainly from the idiosyncratic properties of the money demand, specically
how it responds to productivity shocks.
The paper follows in the tradition of Barro (1979) and Lucas and Stokey (1983), in which
the role of government debt is to smooth tax distortions over time. The standard approach,
which relies on the assumption that the government can commit to future policy choices, oers
valuable normative insights, but is problematic as positive theory. In general, with commitment,
the policy prescription is time-inconsistent, long-run debt levels are indeterminate and the
predicted behavior of taxes and nominal interest rates is counterfactually smooth. As argued in
Martin (2009) and Martin (2011b), relaxing the commitment assumption resolves these issues
and allows the theory to help explain actual policy. The former paper studies government policy
with limited commitment in a cash-in-advance economy, while the latter characterizes policy in
the Lagos-Wright framework, for the competitive markets case with no aggregate uncertainty,
as described above.
The recent literature on government policy under limited commitment follows the work of
Klein et al. (2008) who characterize Markov-perfect equilibria in a model of optimal taxation. In
addition to Martin (2009, 2011b), several other papers study scal and monetary policy within
this context. D az-Gim enez et al. (2008) compare economies with real vs. nominal debt, with
and without commitment, and evaluate the welfare implications of these dierent institutional
arrangements. Niemann, Pichler and Sorger (2009) analyze the properties in
ation dynamics
under the assumptions of limited commitment and price rigidities. Niemann (2011) studies the
eects of monetary conservatism and scal impatience in the determination of debt. Martin
(2011a) studies the response of government policy to war-expenditure shocks and evaluates the
model in terms of the U.S. experience.
Other related work includes studies of optimal policy in the Lagos-Wright framework.
Gomis-Porqueras and Peralta-Alva (2009) abstract from government debt and show that s-
cal policy can alleviate ineciencies due to Nash bargaining in monetary trade. Aruoba and
3Chugh (2010) study optimal policy with commitment and compare their results with Chari
et al. (1991), which study a cash-in-advance economy.
There are several proposed alternative mechanisms for the determination of the level of
debt, which however, abstract from monetary policy. Battaglini and Coate (2008) show that
ineciencies due to pork-barrel spending provide an explanation for the distribution of (real)
debt in the long-run. Barseghyan et al. (2010) develop the implications of Battaglini and Coate
(2008) for the response of scal policy to productivity shocks at business cycles frequencies.
Diamond (1965), Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) and Shin (2006) provide a role for debt by
using it to reduce dynamic ineciencies.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the general monetary framework.
Section 3 characterizes government policy and derives theoretical results that hold in any mon-
etary economy consistent with the basic framework. All proofs are contained in the appendix.
Section 4 evaluates numerically the properties of long-run policy across three specic environ-
ments. Section 5 compares the properties of government policy in the presence of aggregate
shocks. Section 6 concludes.
2 A Monetary Framework
2.1 Environment
Consider the following class of monetary economies, in the context of the framework proposed
by Lagos and Wright (2005). There is a continuum of innitely-lived agents. Each period,
two markets open in sequence: a day and a night market. In each stage a perishable good is
produced and consumed. At the beginning of each period, agents receive an idiosyncratic shock
that determines their role in the day market. With probability  2 (0;1) an agent wants to
consume but cannot produce the day-good, x, while with probability 1  an agent can produce
but does not want consume. A consumer derives utility u(x), where u is twice continuously
dierentiable, with ux > 0 > uxx. A producer incurs in utility cost f(x), where f is twice
continuously dierentiable, with fx > 0 and fxx  0. Suppose there exists ^ x 2 (0;1) such that
ux(^ x) = fx(
^ x
1 ).
Agents lack commitment and are anonymous, in the sense that private trading histories are
unobservable. Thus, credit transactions between agents are not possible. Since the day market
features lack of double coincidence of wants, some medium of exchange is essential for trade to
occur|see Kocherlakota (1998), Wallace (2001) and Shi (2006).
At night, all agents can produce and consume the night-good, c. The production technology
is assumed to be linear in hours worked, n. Utility from consumption is given by U(c), where
U is twice continuously dierentiable, satises Inada conditions and Uc > 0 > Ucc. Disutility
from labor is given by n, where n is hours worked and  > 0. Let ^ c 2 (0;1) such that
Uc(^ c) = . Assume the following regularity condition holds: Uccc   (Uc   )(1 + Ucccc
Ucc ) < 0 for
all c 2 (0;^ c]|note that the typically adopted U(c) = c1 
1  , with  > 0, satises this requirement.
There is a benevolent government that supplies a valued public good g at night. To nance
its expenditure, the government may use proportional labor taxes , print at money at rate
 and issue one-period nominal bonds, which are redeemable in at money. The public good
is transformed one-to-one from the night-good. Agents derive utility from the public good
according to v(g), where v is twice continuously dierentiable, satises Inada conditions and
vg > 0 > vgg. Let ^ g 2 (0;1) such that vg(^ g) = .
The government announces period policy fB0;;;gg at the beginning of the day, before
4agents' idiosyncratic shocks are realized. It commits to this policy within the period, but lacks
the ability to commit to future policy choices. The government only actively participates in the
night-market, i.e., taxes are levied on hours worked at night and open market operations are
conducted in the night market. As in Aruoba and Chugh (2010), Berentsen and Waller (2008)
and Martin (2011b), public bonds are book-entries in the government's record. Since bonds are
not physical objects and the government does not participate in the day market (i.e., cannot
intermediate or provide third-party verication), bonds are not used as a medium of exchange
in the day market and thus, money is essential.
All nominal variables|except for bond prices|are normalized by the aggregate money
stock. Thus, today's aggregate money supply is equal to 1 and tomorrow's is 1 + . The
government budget constraint is
1 + B + pg = pn + (1 + )(1 + qB0); (1)
where B is the current aggregate bond-money ratio, p is the|normalized|market price of the
night-good c, and q is the price of a bond that earns one unit of at money in the following night
market. \Primes" denote variables evaluated in the following period. Thus, B0 is tomorrow's
aggregate bond-money ratio.
2.2 The night market
An agent arrives to the night market with individual money balances m and government bonds b.
Since bonds are redeemed in at money at par, the composition of an agent's nominal portfolio
at the beginning of the night is irrelevant. Let z  m + b, i.e., total|normalized|nominal
holdings. The budget constraint of an agent at night is
pc + (1 + )(m0 + qb0) = p(1   )n + z: (2)
Let V (m;b) be the value of entering the day market with money balances m and bond
balances b, and let W(z) be the value of entering the night market with total nominal balances
z. After solving n from (2), the problem of an agent in the night market is
W(z) = max




(z   (1 + )(m0 + qb0))
p(1   )
+ V (m0;b0):














b = 0: (5)
Focusing on a symmetric equilibrium, we can follow Lagos and Wright (2005) to show that
(4) and (5) imply all agents exit the night market with the same money and bond balances:
m0 = 1 and b0 = B0.3 The night aggregate resource constraint is c+g = n, where n is aggregate
labor. Note that private consumption c and public consumption g are the same for all agents,
whereas individual labor depends on whether an agent was a consumer or a producer during
the day. The night-value function W is linear, Wz = 







3Since V is linear in b, a non-degenerate distribution of bonds is possible in equilibrium. Here, we focus on
symmetric equilibria. See Aruoba and Chugh (2010) and Martin (2011b) for related discussions.
52.3 The day market
During the day, consumers and producers exchange money for goods. The day-resource con-
straint is x = (1   ), where x is the individual quantity consumed and  the individual
quantity produced. The terms of trade depend on the details of the day-market. For example,
trade can be decentralized or centralized, there may be nancial institutions that intermediate
money from producers to consumers, etc. The focus of this paper is on how dierent day-market
specications aect the predictions for government policy. The following assumption restricts
the set of monetary economies I will be analyzing.
Assumption 1 In the day-market, in a monetary equilibrium: (i) the producer's problem is
characterized by (x) = Wz, where  is continuously dierentiable, (x) > 0, x > 0 and
xx  0 for all x > 0; and (ii) 
(x) = Vm   Wz, where 
 is continuously dierentiable,

(x) > 0 for all x 2 (0; ^ x), 
(^ x) = 0, 
x(^ x) < 0, and 
(x) < 0 for all x > ^ x.
Assumption 1(i) states the production decision in equilibrium. Wz is the real marginal ben-
et of arriving at night with an extra unit of nominal assets. The function (x) represents the
marginal utility cost for a producer, expressed in terms of day-purchasing power. Since pro-
ducers get compensated with money for their production costs, these two expressions should be
equated in equilibrium. The specic functional form of (x) depends on how the terms of trade
are determined, and is obtained after applying the day-resource constraint and corresponding
market clearing conditions (which is why it does not depend on  or z). Note that (x) is
strictly increasing in x which simply means that higher production is associated with a higher





Assumption 1(ii) states that, in equilibrium, the shadow value of liquidity in the day market
is a function of day-good output, as determined by 
(x), which is also obtained after applying
the day-resource constraint and corresponding market clearing conditions. As I discuss in the
following section, an important restriction here is that monetary trade in the day-market can
be ecient, i.e, 
(^ x) = 0. The properties of the function 
(x) also allow for the existence of
monetary equilibria where the allocation of the day good is below the ecient level.
Lemma 1 In a monetary equilibrium: (i) Vm = 
(x) + (x); (ii) Vb = (x); (iii) 
(x)  0;
(iv) consumers spend all their money holdings in the day-market.
All proofs are in Appendix A. Intuitively, parts (i) and (ii) of Lemma 1 follow from the
fact that since bonds are not used as means of payment in day, their marginal value in the day
and night markets need to be equal in equilibrium. Part (iii) obtains since for money to be
valued in equilibrium, it needs to provide a liquidity service in the day market. By (6), this
result also guarantees the nominal interest rate is non-negative in equilibrium, i.e., q  1. Part
(iv) is a standard result in this class of economies: if Vm > Wz (i.e., x < ^ x), then the value
of money is too high which means consumers are cash-constrained; if Vm = Wz (i.e., x = ^ x),
there is no opportunity cost of holding money and consumers spend all their cash without loss
of generality.
6We can now collect the conditions that characterize a monetary equilibrium. After some



















A monetary economy within this framework is thus spanned by a pair f(x);
(x)g.
3 Government Policy
3.1 Problem of the government
As mentioned above, the government lacks the ability to commit to future policy choices and
announces policy fB0;;;gg at the beginning of each period, after observing the level of inher-
ited debt, B. To characterize government policy with limited commitment, I adopt the notion
of Markov-perfect equilibrium, i.e., where policy functions depend only on fundamentals.4
The literature on optimal policy typically applies what is known as the primal approach,
which consists of using the rst-order conditions of the agent's problem to substitute prices
and policy instruments for allocations in the government budget constraint. Following this
approach, the problem of a government with limited commitment can be written in terms of
choosing debt and allocations, as described below.
Using the night-resource constraint, c + g = n, and conditions (8)|(11), we can write the
government budget constraint in a monetary equilibrium as
(Uc   )c   g + 
(X(B0)) + (X(B0))(1 + B0)   (x)(1 + B) = 0; (12)
where X(B0) is the day-good allocation that the current government anticipates its future-self
will implement as a function of inherited debt. Due to the limited commitment friction, the
government today takes this policy function as given.
Notice that from (8), for a given x0 = X(B0), a higher  implies a lower x, since (x) is
strictly increasing. In other words, given current debt policy and future monetary policy, the
allocation of the day-good is a function of current monetary policy. Thus, we can interchange-
ably refer to variations in the day-good allocation and variations in current monetary policy.
Similarly, from (9) a higher tax rate is equivalent to lower night-good consumption, c.
The problem of the current government is to choose B0, x, c and g in order to maximize
agents' present value utility. The government is constrained to satisfy its period budget con-
straint in a monetary equilibrium, as determined by (12) and Lemma 1(iii), anticipating that
future policy will react to the level of inherited nominal liabilities. Let   2 [ 1;  B] be the set of
possible debt levels, where  B is large enough so that it does not constrain government behavior.
The lower bound on   is not restrictive, as shown in Proposition 1(iv) below.
4See Maskin and Tirole (2001) for a denition and justication of this solution concept. For recent applications
to dynamic policy games see Ortigueira (2006), Klein et al. (2008), D az-Gim enez et al. (2008), Martin (2009,
2010, 2011b), Azzimonti et al. (2009) and Niemann (2011), among others.




u(x)   (1   )f() + U(c) + v(g)   (c + g) + V(B0)
subject to (12), 
(x)  0 and where  =
x
1  by the day-resource constraint. Government
policy in equilibrium is dened as follows.
Denition 1 A Markov-Perfect Monetary Equilibrium (MPME) is a set of functions fB;X;C;G;Vg :
  !    R3
+  R, such that for all B 2  :







subject to (12) and 
(x)  0; and






Assume the policy function X(B) followed by future governments is dierentiable.5 Let  and 
be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraints of the government's problem. Given
VB =  (x) and 0 = (B0), the rst-order conditions are




x(1 + B0)] = 0 (13)
(ux   f)   x(1 + B) + 
x = 0 (14)
Uc    + (Uc    + Uccc) = 0 (15)
  + vg    = 0: (16)
The following statement establishes some important properties of the equilibrium.
Proposition 1 In a MPME, for all B 2  : (i) (B) > 0; (ii) (B) = 0; (iii) XB < 0; and
(iv) B(B) >  1 and q(B) < 1.
The intuition for Proposition 1(i) is that, given the incentives to smooth distortions over
time, the government will not implement the rst-best allocation in the current period if there
are expected distortions in the future. In order to eliminate policy distortions, the government
needs to: contract the money supply at rate  1; impose zero taxes; and provide the rst-best
level of expenditure. In principle, there are two ways it could achieve this. First, the government
could start with sucient claims on the private sector (negative debt) to implement the rst-
best. The level of steady state debt that implements the rst-best policy is ^ B =  1 
^ g
(1 )(^ x),
which is outside of  . A second possibility is that the government implements the rst-best
allocation by continually rolling over the debt. This policy is inconsistent with equilibrium, as
shown in the proof|see Appendix A. From (9) and (15),  > 0 implies  > 0, i.e., tax rates are
always positive, for all levels of debt. Similarly, from (16) the public good provision is always
below the ecient level.
5This is a renement that rules out equilibria where discontinuities in policy are not rooted in the environment
fundamentals, but are rather an artifact of the innite horizon. For an analysis and discussion of non-dierentiable
Markov-perfect equilibria see Krusell and Smith (2003) and Martin (2009). See also Martin (2011b) for further
discussion in a similar context.
8Proposition 1(ii) establishes that the non-negativity constraint 
(x)  0 does not bind for
any B 2  . This result relies on Assumption 1(ii), i.e., that the ecient allocation in the day-
market can be achieved through monetary trade. Monetary economies where this assumption
does not hold, may very well feature X(B) =  x < ^ x for all B 2  |see Appendix B.4 for an
example.
Proposition 1(iii) rules out the possibility that the day-good allocation could be (weakly)
increasing in debt. This would be inconsistent with an equilibrium since it would imply the
government could increase debt and welfare at the same time, which in turn would mean it is not
constrained by a budgetary restriction, a contradiction with Proposition 1(i). In equilibrium,
we obtain X( 1) = ^ x and X(B) < ^ x for all B >  1.
Finally, Proposition 1(iv) oers two important results. First, B(B) >  1, which means the
government always chooses to carry over strictly positive net nominal liabilities (money plus
bonds). Second, the Friedman rule of zero nominal interest rate (q = 1) is not implemented in
equilibrium, for any level of debt.
3.3 Determination of government policy
The presence of the derivative of the equilibrium function X(B) in (13) re
ects a time-consistency
problem, as the government tomorrow will not internalize how its policy aected current ac-
tions. In equilibrium, government policy results from the interaction between monetary policy
and government debt. This interaction introduces both intratemporal and intertemporal trade-
os.
First, the government has an incentive to in
ate away its inherited nominal liabilities, at
the cost of distorting the allocation of the day-good. Given  > 0 and  = 0 by Proposition
1, condition (14) states that an increase in beginning-of-period debt, B, implies a decrease in
day-good consumption, x. In other words, the incentive to use in
ation increases with the level
of debt and thus, XB < 0. This is the channel through which debt aects monetary policy.
Second, the government faces an intertemporal trade-o, as stated in (13). The term
(X(B0))[   (B0)] is the standard trade-o between current and future distortions, and
is the basis for the classic tax-smoothing argument, due to Barro (1979), which involves set-





x(1 + B0)]. From Lemma 1, we have 










dx0 B0. Given X 0
B < 0 by Proposition 1, the sign of this last ex-
pression will determine how policy distortions are substituted intertemporally, i.e., how debt
evolves over time.
To facilitate the argument, suppose the model primitives are such that dVm
dx = 
x + x < 0





implies there is an increase in tomorrow's marginal value of money. I.e., agents tomorrow, facing
higher in
ation due to higher debt, would have preferred to have arrived with more money. Thus,
the current demand for money increases, which relaxes the government budget constraint today.




B < 0, i.e., increasing debt today implies higher future
in
ation, which reduces the current demand for bonds. In other words, the interest rate paid
on debt increases, which tightens the government budget constraint. For low levels of debt, the
former eect dominates, providing an incentive to increase the debt, whereas for large levels of
debt the latter eect dominates, providing an incentive to decrease debt. The gains from these
incentives are oset by the losses due to lower intertemporal distortion smoothing, i.e., a larger
wedge    (B0).
93.4 Long-run debt
In steady state, (13) simplies to 

x + 
x(1 + B) = 0, since XB < 0 for all B 2   by













x = 0 (18)
v
g(U
c   ) + (v
g   )U
ccc = 0 (19)
(U








Thus, even though from (13) the MPME depends globally on the derivative of the X(B) func-
tion, the steady state can be solved locally. The proposition below relates long-run debt with
environment primitives, which will be useful when calibrating specic economies




In the specic monetary economies analyzed in subsequent sections, the condition 
x+x <
0 can be satised given suciently high curvature on the day-good utility function.
Although small changes in debt choice at B still have an eect on future policy, since
X 
B < 0, the positive and negative eects of these changes on the current government budget
constraint are balanced out. In other words, the time-consistency problem, which is driving the
change in debt, cancels out at the steady state. It follows that if the governments starts at B,
it will stay there, regardless of its ability to commit. The following proposition generalizes the
result in Martin (2011b).
Proposition 3 Irrelevance of commitment at B. Suppose initial debt is equal to B; then,
a government with commitment and a government without commitment will both implement the
allocation fx;c;gg and choose debt level B in every period.
Thus, the steady state is constrained-ecient, since endowing the government with commit-
ment at B would not aect the allocation. This is an important property of this monetary
framework: limited commitment by the government provides a mechanism that explains the
level of debt and thus, policy in general, but is not a primary concern in terms of institutional
design and welfare. Another implication is that time-consistency of the optimal (commitment)
policy is not necessarily linked to the optimality of the Friedman rule, as previously suggested
by the results in Alvarez et al. (2004). At B there is no time-consistency problem, even though
the government is in
ating away its nominal liabilities.
The last result in this section establishes conditions under which distinct monetary economies
share similar properties in the long-run.
Proposition 4 Equivalence of monetary economies. Consider a set of distinct monetary
economies: f
i(x);i(x)gn










, for all fi;jg.
Then: (i) fxi;ci;gi;ig = fxj;cj;gj;jg; (ii) fBi;i;qig 6= fBj;j;qjg; and (iii)
if i(x) < j(x) then Bi > Bj, i > j and qi < qj.
Economies that feature the same shadow value of liquidity in the day market, plus some
notion of proportionality in the incentives to produce the day-good, will share the same long-
run allocation and taxes. However, debt and in
ation will be higher in the economy where the
10incentives to produce are higher, i.e., (x) is lower. In such a case, the costs associated with
future monetary policy distortions are lower as well and thus, the government's incentives to
issue debt are higher. Given the larger debt, long-run in
ation ends up being higher, due to
the higher nancial burden.
4 Evaluation
4.1 Three monetary economies
Consider three distinct day-market specications for the framework analyzed above. The rst
monetary economy, \competitive markets", assumes consumers and producers in the day trade
goods for money in competitive markets. The second, \nancial intermediation" expands on
the previous economy by allowing banks to intermediate money from producers to consumers.
The third, \trading frictions" assumes trade is decentralized, with buyers and sellers trading
in bilateral meetings and no nancial intermediation. In this last case, the measure of buyers
and sellers is the same ( = 1
2) and the trading surplus is split according to the proportional
solution due to Kalai (1977), with buyer's bargaining weight  2 (0;1],
The economy with nancial intermediation has only those frictions necessary to make a
medium of exchange essential: lack of double coincidence of wants, imperfect record keeping
and limited commitment. The case with competitive markets adds a nancial friction which
precludes the intermediation of at money in the day market. Finally, the case with trading
frictions features the most number of frictions, both nancial and trading.
Table 1 summarizes the three economies described above by specifying the corresponding
functional forms for (x) and 
(x). These expressions are derived formally in Appendix B.
Table 1: Monetary economies
Variable Competitive Financial Trading
Markets Intermediation Frictions
(x) fx fx (1   )u(x) + f(x)

(x) x(ux   f) x(ux   f)
(x)(ux fx)
2x
Note: By the day-resource constraint  =
x
1 . In the economy with trading frictions,  =
1
2.
The critical parameters that dierentiate the three monetary economies are  and . The
cases with competitive markets and nancial intermediation become more similar as the measure
of consumers  increases. The reason is that banks channel money balances from producers
to consumers and this eect becomes less prominent as the measure of producers decreases.
Assuming  = 1
2 and f(x) linear in x, the case with trading frictions approaches the competitive
markets solutions as  ! 1.
Note that the economies with competitive markets and nancial intermediation satisfy the
assumptions in Proposition 4. Thus, given the same parameterization, both these economies
exhibit the same long-run allocation fx;c;gg and the same long-run tax rates, but dier in
the level of debt, the money growth rate and the nominal interest rate. In particular, since
(x) is lower for the case with nancial intermediation, steady state debt and in
ation are
higher with nancial intermediation than competitive markets, while the nominal interest rate
is lower. These results inform us of what would happen to government policy if we were to
resolve nancial frictions in the competitive markets economy|see below for a quantitative
11assessment.
4.2 Calibration




1  if  x = 0
(x+ x)1   x1 





v(g) =   lng:
When there are no trading frictions we set  x = 0, so that u(x) is standard CES; for the case with
trading frictions we need  x > 0 since bargaining requires a positive surplus and thus, u(0) = 0.
For now, normalize   = 1 and set  = 1
2. The parameters left to calibrate are , , , , , 
and  x.
Dene nominal GDP as the sum of nominal output in the day and night markets. Let Y be
nominal GDP normalized by the aggregate money stock, i.e., Y  ~ px+p(c+g), where ~ p is the
(normalized) price of the day-good|see Appendix B. Note that by the equation of exchange,
Y is also equal to velocity of circulation. For the case with competitive markets, ~ px = 1 and
thus, Y = +p(c+g). With nancial intermediation, ~ px = 1
 and thus, Y = 1+p(c+g). With
trading frictions, note that the implicit price in all bilateral meetings is 1
x; thus, Y is the same
as with competitive markets. For the cases with competitive markets and trading frictions, the
night market is 91% of total GDP; with nancial intermediation, the relative size of the night
market drops to 82%.
Calibration targets are taken from 1962-2006 averages for the U.S. economy. Period length is
set to a year. Government in the model corresponds to the federal government. The calibration
targets are: debt over GDP, annual in
ation, interest payment over GDP, outlays (excluding
interest) over GDP and revenues over GDP. In
ation is measured from the CPI, while the rest
of the variables are taken from the Congressional Budget Oce. Government debt is dened as
debt held by the public, excluding holdings by the Federal Reserve system.
Next, we need to specify the model steady state statistics that correspond to the selected
calibration targets. For debt over GDP use
B(1+)
Y , since debt is measured at the end of the
period in the data. Let  be annual in
ation in the model, which in steady state is equal
to . Interest payments over GDP are dened as
B(1+)(1 q)
Y . Given that debt over GDP is
already targeted, this implies a target for the nominal interest rate i, where i = 1
q   1. Interest
payments are 2:1% of GDP in the data, which implies a target nominal interest rate of 7:3%




Y , respectively, where n = c + g from
the night-resource constraint. For the case with trading frictions, the typical approach is to
include an additional target, the price-to-marginal cost ratio or markup.6 Since the markup in
the night-market is zero, the markup is equal to the share of the day-market output in GDP






. I use the
usual target adopted by the literature, 10%. Table 2 summarizes the target statistics.
Table 3 shows the parameters that match the calibration targets for each of the environments
considered. As mentioned above, for the cases with no trading frictions,  x = 0. For the case with
trading frictions,  x = 0:5 and  is set equal to 0:8739 to match the markup, !. The value of  x is
6See Lagos and Wright (2005) and Aruoba et al. (2011) for further discussion.
12Table 2: Target statistics
B(1+)




0:308 0:044 0:073 0:182 0:182 0:100
Note: ! is a calibration target only for the case with trading frictions.
much higher than the typically found in the literature (which is close to zero, say  x = 0:0001).
The reasons is that lower values of  x imply higher values of  to match the markup target (see
the expression for ! above); e.g., if  x = 0:25 then  = 0:9284, and if  x = 0:005 then  = 0:9989.
The benchmark value for  x is a compromise between making the environment with trading
frictions suciently dierent from the competitive markets case and not deviating too much
from a standard CES utility specication. It is important to point out that the quantitative
results reported in the sections below are not aected by the choice of  x. In particular, setting
 x = 0:5 (and recalibrating) for the cases without trading frictions or setting  x = 0:005 (and
recalibrating) for the case with trading friction have only minor quantitative eects that are
not suciently signicant to overturn any of the conclusions.
Table 3: Benchmark calibration
Parameters Competitive Financial Trading
Markets Intermediation Frictions
 4:9801 4:1722 5:1648
 0:9728 0:9728 0:9728
 7:3670 8:1879 6:4633
 4:6965 2:5084 5:8405
 1:3332 4:8290 1:3701
  1:0000 1:0000 1:0000
 0:5000 0:5000 |
 | | 0:8739
 x 0:0000 0:0000 0:5000
The steady state allocation fB;x;c;gg is found by solving numerically the system of
equations (17)|(20). Table 4 shows the solutions for all the cases considered.
Table 4: Steady state variables for benchmark calibration
Competitive Financial Trading
Markets Intermediation Frictions
B 1:619 1:619 1:619
x 0:914 0:519 0:422
c 0:780 0:814 0:749
g 0:195 0:233 0:188
4.3 Comparative statics
To further understand the dierences in long-run policy across cases, we can analyze the response
of steady state statistics to changes in parameter values. Each parameter is perturbed by 10%.
13Next, the percentage change in a steady state statistic is divided by the percentage change in
the parameter value, to measure the elasticity of the statistic to changes in parameters. Table
5 presents the results, highlighting elasticities between 0:25 and 1, and elasticities above 1, plus
the sign of the change in statistics.7 See Appendix C for a table with the actual gures.
Table 5: Parameter-elasticity of steady state statistics
Competitive Markets Financial Intermediation Trading Frictions
                   
B(1+)
Y    + ++   ++   + + ++       ++
   ++    ++ ++      ++ ++        ++ ++
   +   +   +
pn
Y    +   +   +
pg
Y    +   +   +
Note: Each parameter is increased and then decreased by 10%. Elasticity is measured as the percentage change in
a statistic divided by 1:1=0:9   1, where the change in statistic corresponds to 10% change in parameter value.
A positive (negative) sign implies the statistic increases (decreases) with an increase in parameter value. A single
sign implies the elasticity is higher than 0:25 but lower than 1; a double sign implies the elasticity is equal to or
higher than 1. For the case with trading frictions,  is omitted since it is always assumed that  = 0:5.
Let us rst focus on the case with competitive markets. As we can see, only debt and
in
ation feature parameter-elasticities greater than 1: both variables are increasing in  and
; in addition, in
ation also increases signicantly with reductions in  and increases in  .
The remaining eects feature lower parameter-elasticities. In this sense, increases in  reduce
debt, in
ation, taxes, expenditure and revenue; increases in  increase debt; and increases in  
increase taxes, expenditure and revenue.
The other two monetary economies feature some notable similarities with the competitive
markets case. Most notably, the eect of changes in  and   go in the same direction for all
three variants; quantitatively, the eect is also very similar across model variants|see Appendix
C. In all three cases, an increase in  implies a large increase in both debt and in
ation.
Quantitatively, the eect is signicantly larger for the case with trading frictions.
There are two dierences in comparative statics worth highlighting. For the case with
nancial intermediation, changes in  aect debt, but not in
ation. For the case with trading
frictions, an increase in  decreases both debt and in
ation, in sharp contrast with the other
two cases, which feature an increase in debt and no change in in
ation.
The results in this section highlight the long-run interaction between scal and monetary
policies. First, a higher demand for public goods (larger  ) results in signicantly higher
in
ation and taxes, but has very small eects on debt. This is consistent with the standard
distortion-smoothing argument which states that permanent increases in expenditure should be
nances with taxation. Second, the determinants of the money demand fundamentally aect
debt and monetary policy. The expression dVm
dx , which as analyzed above determines how the
current demand for money reacts to change in future monetary policy, depends critically on 
and . The larger the response of money demand today to variations in future monetary policy,
the larger the incentive to issue debt, which in turn results in higher in
ation to alleviate its
nancial burden.
7The cut-o point of 0:25 is somewhat arbitrary. The idea is to focus on changes in long-run statistics which
are suciently signicant, given that the change in parameter values is
1:1
0:9   1  0:222.
144.4 Frictions and long-run policy
What are the eects on long-run policy of resolving the dierent frictions that aict the envi-
ronments studied above?
First, suppose we resolve trading frictions. Thus, take the parameterization for the case
with trading frictions and solve the case with competitive markets. In steady state, debt over
GDP decreases to 4:1%, annual in
ation drops to 1:7%, while tax revenue and expenditure both
increase slightly to about 19% of GDP. If we consider a higher bargaining power for consumers
and recalibrate, the dierence in statistics becomes even larger. The reason is that as we increase
 (lower  x), we need to reduce  to match the target statistics for the case with trading frictions.
From (17) and Table 1, note that B is increasing in  in all economies; thus, when we switch
to the case with competitive markets, long-run debt (and thus, in
ation) decreases even more.
Second, suppose we shut down the banking sector. Thus, take the parameterization for
the case with nancial intermediation and solve the case with competitive markets. From
Proposition 4 we know that in the long-run, only debt, in
ation and the nominal interest rate
change; without banks, steady state debt over GDP decreases to 11:4%, while annual in
ation
drops to 0:8%. Note that the magnitude of these policy changes are inversely related to the
assumed value for . For example, set  = 0:8 and recalibrate the economy with nancial
intermediation; thus,  = 2:2101 while all other parameters remain at benchmark. If we now
solve the steady state with competitive markets, we get debt over GDP of 25:7% and annual
in
ation of 3:0%; i.e., the changes are signicant, but not quite as dramatic as when  = 0:5.
The analysis shows that resolving trading frictions reduces long-run debt and in
ation,
whereas resolving nancial frictions has the opposite eect. The quantitative magnitude of these
eects may be quite seizable. Given that with certain technological advances (e.g., electronic
record keeping, automation), both goods markets and nancial markets become more ecient,
the results indicate that these improvements may have a signicant impact on government
policy. Recovering the contribution of these changes from the data may prove dicult as they
have canceling eects. In addition, these institutional changes to not occur in isolation; e.g.,
technological advances that alleviate trading and nancial frictions are likely to also improve
labor productivity.
5 Government Policy and Aggregate Uncertainty
This section studies government policy in the presence of aggregate uncertainty. The focus
is on understanding how policy response to aggregate shocks depends on the details of the
monetary economy. I consider shocks to government expenditure and aggregate productivity
and compare the model variants along four dimensions: the response of government policy to
aggregate shocks; the persistence of policy variables; the money demand; and the Phillips curve.
5.1 Government policy in monetary economies with aggregate uncertainty
Suppose there are two aggregate shocks: one to the marginal value of the public good (an
\expenditure" shock) and one to the productivity of labor. The utility derived from the public
good is now v(g) =  (g), where g > 0 > gg and   is a random variable. Let A be labor
productivity, which aects both day and night output, and follows a random process. Thus, day-
good producers incur a utility cost f(x;A), where f is strictly decreasing in A, and night-output
is equal to An.
Let s  f ;Ag follow a Markov process and let E[s0js] be the expected value of s0 given
15s. The set of all possible realizations for the stochastic state is S. A monetary economy, as
constructed in Section 2, in now spanned by functions (x;s) and 
(x;s). After solving for the












(X(B0;s0);s0) + (X(B0;s0);s0)(1 + B0) j s

= 0: (21)
Given aggregate state (B;s) and anticipating future governments will implement X(B;s),
the problem of the current government is
max
B0;x;c;g
u(x)   (1   )f(;A) + U(c)  
(c + g)
A
+  (g) + E[V(B0;s0) j s]
subject to (21), where  =
x




(X(B0;s0);s0)(A g   A0 00
















+ (A g   )Uccc = 0: (24)
Denition 2 A MPME in a stochastic economy is characterized by a set of functions fB(B;s),
X(B;s), C(B;s), G(B;s)g:    S !    R3
+ that satisfy (21)|(24), for all (B;s) 2    S.
The expressions for (x;s) and 
(x;s) are easily derived for each of the three monetary
economies analyzed here. Suppose the disutility cost for a producer in the day is given by
f(x;s) =
x






A). With nancial frictions we have (x;s) 
x
A and 
(x;s)  x(ux  

A). With





2x . Note that all
these functions depend on A but not  , since preferences are separable in the public good.
5.2 Calibration
As a reference, Table 6 shows a summary of the time-series properties at annual frequencies of
selected policy variables for the U.S. between 1962 and 2006. The table includes the variable
dGDP, which is linearly-detrended (log) real GDP.
Table 6: Time-series properties of U.S. economy | 1962-2006
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Autocorr.
Debt/GDP 0:308 0:078 0:967
In
ation 0:044 0:030 0:747
Revenue/GDP 0:182 0:010 0:653
Outlays/GDP 0:182 0:012 0:798
Decit/GDP 0:001 0:018 0:743
dGDP 0:000 0:027 0:715
I keep the benchmark calibration from the previous section and assume the following:
 0 = 1   %g + %g  + 0
g
lnA0 = %A lnA + 0
A;
8To derive the day-utility cost, assume a production function x = Ae and linear disutility in eort,  e.
16where %g;%A 2 (0;1), g  N(0;2
g) and A  N(0;2
A). Note that both   and A average 1, as
in the economies without aggregate uncertainty. The model is solved globally using a projection
method. See Appendix D for a description of the algorithm and other details of the numerical
approximation.
There are many alternative ways to calibrate or estimate the stochastic processes for   and
A. Here, I adopt an approach that allows for a single parameterization to oer empirically
plausible dynamics for all three variants. Specically, the stochastic process for   is set to
match the autocorrelation and variance of government expenditure over GDP, assuming labor
productivity is constant and equal to its long-run value; the process for A is set to match the
autocorrelation and variance of detrended (log) real GDP (i.e., dGDP), assuming the marginal
value for public good consumption is xed at its long-run value. In both cases, I target the
statistics for the case with competitive markets, but the assumed processes also match the
statistics for the other two cases, with only very minor deviations in the autocorrelation of
expenditure and dGDP. The calibrated parameters are: %g = 0:804, %A = 0:726, g = 0:045;
A = 0:061.
5.3 Time-series properties of articial economies
Articial economies are simulated for 1;000;000 periods, starting from their respective non-
stochastic steady states. Table 7 shows average, standard deviation and autocorrelation of
selected policy variables. There are three dierent simulations for each of the three monetary
economies: expenditure shocks only, productivity shocks only, and both shocks. The variable
dy in the model corresponds to dGDP, i.e., linearly detrended (log) real GDP. See Appendix D
for a description of how it was computed.
Consider rst the environment with competitive markets. Almost all of the volatility in debt
and tax revenue is due to expenditure shocks, while most of the volatility in in
ation is due
to productivity shocks. The volatility of expenditure is similar for the two types of shocks and
gets compounded when including both. The autocorrelation of these four policy variables is
higher under expenditure shocks than productivity shocks, which is not surprising considering
that expenditure shocks are more persistent than productivity shocks. The autocorrelation of
in
ation varies signicantly with the type of shock, a feature which is analyzed further below.
The primary decit is slightly more volatile with productivity shocks, but the autocorrelation
is nearly identical under the two types of shocks. When we consider both shocks, the volatility
and autocorrelation of policy variables are reasonably close to the data, except for the autocor-
relations of in
ation and tax revenues|see Table 6.
Let us now compare policy across the dierent environments. The behavior of variables in
the presence of government expenditure shocks is very similar in all cases. In contrast, the be-
havior of policy variables in response to productivity shocks features some important dierences.
Compared to the case with competitive markets, introducing nancial intermediation results
in slightly higher volatility in debt and in
ation; the autocorrelation of in
ation drops quite
signicantly and the autocorrelation of tax revenues increases. Incorporating trading frictions
results in larger increases in the volatility of debt and in
ation; the autocorrelation of in
ation
changes sign (becomes negative) and the autocorrelation of tax revenue increases even more.
There is also a signicant drop in the autocorrelation of the decit. When we consider both
types of shocks, the most signicant dierence across cases is the volatility and autocorrelation
of in
ation. For the case with trading friction, we also have a higher volatility in debt and a
lower autocorrelation in the decit.
17Table 7: Statistics for simulated economies
Competitive Markets Financial Intermediation Trading Frictions
Mean Std.Dev. Autocorr. Mean Std.Dev. Autocorr. Mean Std.Dev. Autocorr.
Expenditure shocks
B(1+)
Y 0:305 0:040 0:989 0:304 0:037 0:989 0:305 0:039 0:989
 0:044 0:009 0:883 0:044 0:008 0:872 0:044 0:009 0:874
pn
Y 0:182 0:007 0:935 0:182 0:008 0:928 0:182 0:007 0:933
pg
Y 0:182 0:012 0:798 0:182 0:012 0:800 0:182 0:012 0:797
p(g n)
Y 0:000 0:007 0:703 0:000 0:006 0:698 0:000 0:006 0:698
dy 0:000 0:013 0:780 0:000 0:013 0:775 0:000 0:013 0:771
Productivity shocks
B(1+)
Y 0:310 0:009 0:921 0:311 0:018 0:933 0:310 0:042 0:942
 0:046 0:031 0:311 0:046 0:038 0:079 0:047 0:057  0:070
pn
Y 0:182 0:001 0:906 0:182 0:002 0:945 0:182 0:004 0:975
pg
Y 0:182 0:012 0:716 0:182 0:011 0:719 0:182 0:011 0:720
p(g n)
Y 0:001 0:011 0:701 0:001 0:010 0:681 0:000 0:009 0:639
dy 0:000 0:027 0:714 0:000 0:030 0:713 0:000 0:029 0:707
Both shocks
B(1+)
Y 0:307 0:041 0:986 0:307 0:041 0:978 0:307 0:057 0:964
 0:046 0:032 0:355 0:045 0:039 0:116 0:046 0:058  0:047
pn
Y 0:182 0:007 0:933 0:182 0:008 0:930 0:182 0:008 0:942
pg
Y 0:182 0:017 0:758 0:182 0:016 0:763 0:182 0:016 0:763
p(g n)
Y 0:001 0:013 0:702 0:000 0:012 0:686 0:000 0:011 0:662
dy 0:000 0:030 0:727 0:000 0:033 0:723 0:000 0:032 0:718
Note: Articial economies are simulated for 1;000;000 periods.
5.4 Policy response to aggregate shocks
Let us further inspect the above ndings, by analyzing the response of government policy to
specic shocks and comparing the results across variants. Figure 1 displays the impulse-response
functions of selected variables to expenditure and aggregate shocks. The responses are computed
from a VAR estimated from the simulated data; the VAR consists of the following variables (in
order):  , A,
p(g n)
Y , dy,  and
B(1+)
Y . This VAR specication allows for an easy and precise
numerical approximation to the true impulse-response functions, which cannot be accurately
computed directly given that the exogenous state space is discrete. As we can see, the responses
of the primary decit, output, the money growth rate and debt are qualitatively similar in all
environments. Furthermore, the three policy variables are procyclical in all cases. The main
dierence across monetary economies is the quantitative response of debt and monetary policy
to productivity shocks. This is the source of the dierences in time-series statistics across cases,
as reported in Table 7.
When a positive expenditure shock hits the economy (left panel in Figure 1), there is a
persistent increase in the primary decit. This is a standard result in any tax-smoothing model.
Given that policy distortions are spread-out over time, the temporary increase in demand for
night-goods by the government implies an increase in total output. Debt builds up as decits
accumulate and the eect is very persistent. The money growth rate also increases, in part
to nance the extra expenditure and in part to nance the accumulated debt. These ndings
are consistent with the facts on post-war U.S. policy identied by Marcet and Scott (2009),
most notably, the relative high persistence of debt, the persistence of decit 
uctuations and
18the positive co-movement of decit and debt. The policy response is also consistent with the
stylized facts of U.S. wartime nancing|see Martin (2009) and, more recently, Martin (2011a)
for more in-depth analysis.
A positive productivity shock (right panel in Figure 1) has a similar qualitative response as
a positive expenditure shock. When productivity increases, agents incur in a lower disutility to
produce output. Thus, policy distortions are low when productivity is temporarily high. This
leads the government to increase the supply of public goods, taxes, and the money growth rate.
The increase in expenditure is larger than in taxes, which results in higher decits. Again, debt
is accumulated as decits persist. How much debt is accumulated and how fast it is repaid
depends critically on the response of the money growth rate and in
ation, as analyzed below.
The policy response in this case is also broadly consistent with the ndings in Marcet and Scott
(2009) enumerated above. However, it is not consistent with their identied fact that positive
innovations to GDP are followed by reductions in debt and decits (instead of increases as in
Figure 1), at least as long as one interprets innovations to output as shocks to productivity. In
the model, tax revenue increases during a boom, as in the data, but the response is too mild,
which leads to the counterfactual implication for decits.9
In all three model variants, the response of in
ation to a productivity shock has an important
dierence with the response of the money growth rate. To see this, note that prices for the case
with competitive markets are ~ p = 1
x and p = AUc
x in the day and night markets, respectively;
taxes are  = 1   
AUc. As reported in Table 7, the volatility of taxes in the presence of
productivity shocks is very small; thus, the volatility of AUc is close to zero. When a positive
innovation to A hits the economy, x increases, AUc remains approximately the same and so,
both ~ p and p decrease. This behavior is displayed despite the fact that  actually increases in
response to a positive innovation in A, as shown in Figure 1. In the subsequent periods after
the shock, prices increase at a decreasing rate; i.e., after the initial period, in
ation follows
the behavior of the money growth rate. Thus, most of the dierence in the autocorrelation of
in
ation between monetary economies is due to how large the initial drop in prices is. This is
a feature of the underlying monetary framework and not of the government policy model.
The case with trading frictions presents an interesting oddity. The response of monetary
policy to a productivity shocks is the smoothest of all cases, while the volatility of in
ation
is the highest. Most of the volatility in in
ation reported for the environment with trading
frictions does not stem from variations in the money supply, but from changes in the money
demand, which in turn reacts to both the aggregate shocks and the endogenous policy response.
5.5 Policy persistence
To better measure the persistence of policy variables, Marcet and Scott (2009) suggest using
the k-variance ratio, which is dened as Pk
x =
V ar(xt xt k)
kV ar(xt xt 1). A variable is more persistent the
longer it takes the k-variance ratio to converge to zero. Figure 2 compares the persistence of
debt, in
ation and the decit, in the data and articial economies.
In the data, the k-variance ratio for debt over GDP is increasing and only starts leveling
o after 9 years at about 3:7. In
ation and the decit are much less persistent and both series
display a more or less decreasing Pk ratio. Furthermore, the persistence in in
ation and the
9Marcet and Scott (2009) show that a Ramsey model of optimal taxation, exogenous expenditure and incom-
plete markets displays decreasing decits and debt in response to a positive productivity shock. However, note
that with commitment, tax rates are essentially constant over the business cycle, so the result follows mechani-
cally from the increase in output. Thus, although the response of the primary decit is consistent with the U.S.
data, the behavior of taxes is not. Their model also abstracts from monetary policy, which would render it a
complete markets environment and therefore nullify all the good predictions. See Chari et al. (1991) and Aruoba
and Chugh (2008) for simulations of economies with commitment and joint scal and monetary policy.
19decit are relatively similar. As we can see in Figure 2, all model variants match these qualitative
features broadly. The Pk ratios for in
ation and the decit are quite close to the data in all
cases, especially after a few periods. The big dierence between variants is in the persistence
of debt. The case with competitive markets provides the best t to the data, whereas the other
two cases match the qualitative shape of debt persistence, but underestimate it quantitatively.
5.6 Money demand
Let us evaluate the model's implication for the money demand, i.e., the relationship between
the nominal interest rate and the inverse of velocity of circulation. Note that neither of these
variables were calibration targets. For the U.S. data, dene velocity of money as nominal GDP
divided by average M1, which is the measure typically adopted by the literature. For the interest
rate, I use the 1-year treasury constant maturity rate published by the Federal Reserve, which is
closely related to the nominal interest rate in the model. One issue with the data is that velocity
of circulation has a secular trend whereas the interest rate does not. To remove this eect, I
linearly detrend the series for the inverse of velocity. In the model, velocity of circulation is
dened as (normalized) nominal aggregate output, Y , and the interest rate is i = 1=q   1.
Consider the money demand regression dkt = 
 dit+"t, where dk and di are deviations from
mean of the (detrended) inverse of velocity and the nominal interest rate, respectively. Table 8
reports the results of the money demand regressions in the data and the model. For the articial
economies, the demand equation is estimated using the simulated sample of 1,000,000 periods.
This method provides an estimate of the \true" relationship between k and i in the model. Fit
can be evaluated by checking whether the model estimate for 
 falls within the one-standard
error band in the data. Figure 3 complements the analysis with a graphical representation of
the money demand curve in the data and the initial 10;000 simulation periods in each monetary
economy.
Table 8: Money demand regression: dkt = 
 dit + "t
U.S. Data Competitive Financial Trading
1962-2006 Markets Intermediation Frictions

  0:442  0:432  0:394  0:105
(0:057) (0:000) (0:000) (0:001)
R2 0:583 0:707 0:644 0:024
Note: Standard errors are shown in parenthesis.
As we can see in Table 8, all cases feature a money demand curve with a negative slope.
The model t is very good for the cases with competitive markets and nancial intermediation.
The case with trading frictions features a poor t, which as can be observed in Figure 3, is due
to the relatively high volatility of the money demand|see Section 5.4 for a related discussion.
5.7 Phillips curve
Lastly, we compare the model variants by studying the implied relationship between in
ation
and output, i.e., a variant of the standard Phillips curve. For the U.S. annual data between
1962 and 2006, the regression dt = 
 dyt+"t implies 
 = 0:521, with a standard error of 0:150.
Table 9 displays the Phillips curve regression for the U.S. data and simulated economies. Figure
4 provides a graphical representation.
20Table 9: Phillips curve regression: dt = 
 dyt + "t
U.S. Data Competitive Financial Trading
1962-2006 Markets Intermediation Frictions

 0:521 0:400 0:152  0:275
(0:150) (0:001) (0:001) (0:002)
R2 0:219 0:141 0:016 0:023
Note: Standard errors are shown in parenthesis.
The case with competitive markets implies an estimated coecient on dyt of 0:400, which
falls within the one standard error band of the data estimate. The positive correlation between
in
ation and GDP in the model obtains despite a negative policy trade-o between the two
variables (since in
ation is distortionary), and results from the interaction between policy and
aggregate shocks over time. Figure 4 displays very clearly how locally negative policy trade-os
shift around with aggregate shocks, so that the long-run relationship becomes positive.
For the case with nancial intermediation, the coecient in the Phillips curve regression is
also positive, but signicantly lower than with competitive markets. For the case with trading
frictions, the coecient is actually negative. In both these variants, the R2 is close to zero, i.e.,
real GDP has virtually no explanatory power for in
ation. This result is also apparent from
Figure 4.
The dierences between economies follow from the behavior of in
ation in the presence of
productivity shocks|see Table 7. To smooth out any artifacts generated by the contempo-
raneous response of in
ation, I run the regressions using 5-year moving averages.10 Table 10
shows that all variants now feature a positively-sloped Phillips curve, although the case with
competitive markets still oers the closest t to the data. Also note that the R2 for all cases is
signicantly higher than in Table 9.
Table 10: Phillips curve regression: dt = 
 dyt + "t, using 5-year moving averages
U.S. Data Competitive Financial Trading
1962-2006 Markets Intermediation Frictions

 0:703 0:704 0:529 0:299
(0:236) (0:002) (0:002) (0:003)
R2 0:186 0:657 0:444 0:098
Note: Standard errors are shown in parenthesis.
5.8 Robustness
A legitimate concern is that the preceding analysis may be sensitive to the calibration adopted
in Section 3. In particular, the values of  and  x where chosen arbitrarily. In this section, I will
verify the robustness of the results obtained above, by focusing on three key elements: (i) the
time-series statistics in Table 7 with both shocks; (ii) the k-variance ratio for debt; and (iii) the
money demand and Phillips curve regressions.11
10I also conducted a similar exercise for the money demand regressions, but found no signicant dierences
with the results presented in Table 8.
11To keep this section brief, I only report the results of the exercise. All supporting computations are available
upon request.
21First, let us analyze how the cases with competitive markets and nancial intermediation
are aected by changes in the measure of buyers, . Lowering  for the case with competitive
markets improves the model t. For example, set  = 0:3 and recalibrate to match the target
statistics. Then, we get the following improvements: standard deviation of debt increases to
0:043; standard deviation of in
ation decreases to 0:030; autocorrelation of in
ation increases
to 0:487; k-variance ratio for debt increases for all periods (after 10 periods it is equal to 3:84);
and 
 coecient in the Phillips curve regression equal to 0:491. The other statistics do not
change signicantly, except for a lower coecient in the money demand regression,  0:412. On
the other hand, varying  (and recalibrating) for the case with nancial intermediation has no
signicant eect on any the variables considered here; all statistics for the simulated economy
look virtually identical for dierent values of .
Second, consider the eects of the parameter  x in the utility function for the day-good,
u(x). The calibration species  x = 0 for the case with competitive markets and  x = 0:500 for
the case with trading frictions. Assume  x = 0:500 for the case with competitive markets and
recalibrate parameters to match target statistics. Then, the results are virtually identical to
those of the benchmark calibration. Suppose instead that we set  x = 0:005 for the case with
trading frictions and recalibrate. Here, there are a few noticeable changes, but not signicant
enough to overturn any of the reported conclusions.
Third, since the reason why the economy with trading frictions does not t the data as well as
the other cases is the behavior of the money demand, consider lowering the size of the bargaining
frictions by reducing the targeted markup by half. In this case the t improves signicantly.
We get: lower volatility and higher persistence of in
ation (the standard deviation falls to
0:048 and the autocorrelation increases to 0:010), although the volatility of debt falls (standard
deviation decreases to 0:051); increased persistence of debt, as measured by the k-variance ratio
(about 15% higher than benchmark after 6 periods); closer estimates for the money demand and
Phillips curve regressions ( 0:242 and  0:052, respectively). Overall, lowering trading frictions
improves model t, but the economies with competitive markets and nancial intermediation
still outperform.
6 Concluding remarks
The results in the preceding sections contribute to two separate strands of the macroeconomic
literature. First, the analysis complements studies in monetary theory by providing a theoretical
treatment of how environment frictions aect the (endogenous) determination of government
policy. It also proposes a method for testing alternative variants of monetary economies by
evaluating their performance relative to the data along several relevant dimensions. Second,
the paper advances our understanding of government policy (both normative and positive) by
identifying which results depend on the specic details of micro founded monetary economies
and which ndings remain unaltered.
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(i) Follows from Assumption 1.
(ii) Since bonds are not used in the day, they do not aect the agent's day problem. Thus,
starting the day with an extra unit of bonds, implies starting the night with an extra unit of
bonds, i.e., Vb = Wz. The result follows from (x) = Wz by Assumption 1.
(iii) For money to be valued in equilibrium, it needs to provide a liquidity service in the day
market. Thus, Vm   Wz  0 and so 
(x)  0.
(iv) By (iii) x  ^ x in a monetary equilibrium. If x < ^ x then Vm > Wz, i.e., the value of
money is too high, which means consumers are cash-constrained. If x = ^ x then Vm = Wz and
consumers spend all their cash without any loss of generality.
A.2 Proposition 1
We will use the following auxiliary lemma.
Lemma 2  = 0 if and only if f^ x;^ c; ^ gg is implemented in all periods.
Proof. Suppose  = 0. Then, from (14) we get x = ^ x, 
x(^ x) < 0 and thus, ux   f =  = 0 is
the only solution. From (15) and (16), we get c = ^ c and g = ^ g. From (13), we get (B0) = 0,
which from (14)|(16) implies x0 = ^ x, c0 = ^ c and g0 = ^ g. Suppose now that x = x0 = ^ x,
c = c0 = ^ c and g = ^ g. Then, equations (14)|(16) all imply  = 0.
(i) Suppose not, i.e., (B) = 0 for some B 2  . Then, (14) becomes (ux   f) + 
x = 0,




  1 > B. By Lemma 2, the rst-best allocation f^ x;^ c; ^ gg is also implemented
in all future periods. Thus, the policy from the current period on is ^  =    1, ^  = 0, ^ q = 1
and ^ p = 
(^ x); the value function is V(B) = ^ V 
u(^ x)+(1 )f(^ )+U(^ c) (^ c+^ g)+v(^ g)
1  .
By Lemma 1(iv), consumers spend all their money in the day. Depending on the specic
structure of the day-market, consumers may be able to borrow some of the money brought by
producers. Given that in equilibrium all agents starts the day with m = 1, the most a consumer
will be able to borrow from producers in any day-market specication is
1 
 . Since we are at
the rst-best, the nancial cost of these loans is zero|note that ^ q = 1, i.e., the nominal interest
rate 1
^ q  1 is zero. Thus, a consumer arrives at the night market with net nominal balances equal
to B , where  2 [0;
1 
 ], and works ^ nc = ^ c
1 ^   
B  (1+^ )(m0+^ qb0)
^ p(1 ^ ) = ^ c 
(^ x)(B  (m0+b0))
 .
If he does not deviate, he chooses m0 = 1 and b0 = B(B) and hence works ^ nc = ^ c+^ g+
(^ x)(1+)
 .
Thus, the equilibrium pay-o for a consumer at night is ^ Wc = U(^ c) (^ c+ ^ g) (^ x)(1+)+
v(^ g) +  ^ V .
Consider now a consumer that deviates at night in the following way: he still consumes ^ c
and chooses m0 = 1, but now he sells all his bonds, i.e., b0 = 0 and saves on work accordingly.
After the current period, the agent maintains a portfolio of zero bonds and nances his (rst-
best) consumption with at money and labor only. Thus, in future periods the agent works
nd = ^ c +
(^ x)( z)
 . Expected nominal balances z are equal to 1, regardless of whether there is
25money intermediation in the day-market or not, and thus expected night-labor is ^ c 
(^ x)(1 )
 .
The value of this continuation strategy is then Vd =
u(^ x)+(1 )f(^ )+U(^ c) ^ c+(^ x)(1 )+v(^ g)
1  . In




 . The pay-o from deviating is Wc
d = U(^ c) ^ c (^ x)( B+)+v(^ g)+Vd.
A consumer has an incentive to deviate only if Wc
d > ^ Wc. After some simple algebra, this
condition reduces to B > ^ B   1  
^ g
(1 )(^ x). Thus, there is a protable deviation from the
equilibrium for any B 2  , a contradiction with (B) = 0 for some B 2  .
(ii) Given x(1+B)  0, (14) implies (ux f)+
x  0. Suppose (ux f)+
x = 0.
Given 
x(^ x) < 0 by Assumption 1, the only solution is x = ^ x. Suppose now (ux f)+
x > 0.
Given 
x(^ x)  0, the solution is x < ^ x and  = 0.








  xx(1 + B)

XB = Bx(1 + B) + x:
Given uxx < 0, f  0,  > 0, xx(1+B)  0 and XB  0, the left-hand side of the expression
above is weakly negative. Since x > 0, we get a contradiction for B =  1 and B < 0 for
B >  1.
From (16), B < 0 implies GB > 0. From (15) and (16) we get F(c;g)  vg(Uc  )+(vg  
)Uccc = 0. By the Implicit Function Theorem, dc
dg =  
Fg
Fc. We get Fg = vgg(Uc +Uccc) > 0,
since from (15),  > 0 implies Uc    + Uccc < 0. Thus, to show dc
dg > 0 and thus, CB > 0,
we need Fc < 0. We get Fc = vgUcc + (vg   )(Ucc + Ucccc), which using F(c;g) = 0 can be




Uccc   (Uc   )(1 + Ucccc
Ucc )
	
; by assumption, this expression is negative,
which implies CB > 0.
Given the above results, starting the period with a higher B results in: (weakly) higher x
since XB  0; higher c and g since CB > 0 and GB > 0; and a more relaxed budget constraint
since B > 0. This implies the government could increase welfare with an innitesimal increase
in debt, which contradicts VB =  (x) < 0.
(iv) By (14) and part (ii), X( 1) = ^ x; by part (iii) X(B) < ^ x for all B >  1.







x > 0 by parts (i) and (iii) and Assumption 1,  ( 1) < 0. This last result holds
regardless of whether the solution is interior or a corner.  < ( 1) rules out B =  1; hence,
B( 1) >  1. Next, focus on B >  1. Evaluating (12) today and tomorrow we get:
(Uc   )c   g   (x)(1 + B) = 0
(U0
c   )c0   g0 + 
(X(B( 1))) + (X(B( 1)))[1 + B( 1)] = 0:
Since B >  1, we get (Uc   )c   g > 0; since B( 1) >  1 and X(B( 1)) < ^ x we get
(U0
c   )c0   g0 < 0. By the argument in part (iii) we know that dc
dg > 0. Also note that
(Uc   )c is strictly decreasing in c since from (15),  > 0 implies Uc    + Uccc < 0. Thus,
c < c0 and g < g0. From (16) this implies  > ( 1), a contradiction.
Given B0 >  1, x0 < ^ x and so from (11) q < 1.
A.3 Proposition 2
Follows from (17), given 
x > 0 by Assumption 1.
26A.4 Proposition 3
Consider the government problem with commitment, also known as the Ramsey problem. A
standard result is that the sequence of government budget constraints collapses to a single
\implementability" constraint. Start with (1). For every period, multiply this equation by
tUc;t





tct   (1   t)gt +




Using (9) and the transversality condition, limT!1 T (1+T)(1+qTBT+1)


















The remaining step is to show that the whole third term can be simplied to an expression that
only depends on fxtg1


























pt simplies to 
(xt). Thus, the implementability constraint is
1 X
t=0
tf(Uc;t   )ct   gt + 
(xt)g   
(x0)   (1 + B0)(x0) = 0: (25)






t fu(xt)   (1   )f(t) + U(ct)   (ct + gt) + v(gt)g
subject to (25) and where t =
xt
1 . It is easy to verify that the non-negativity constraint,

(xt)  0, does not bind in any period. The rst-order conditions are
(ux;0   f;0)   (1 + B0)x;0 = 0; for t = 0
(ux;t   f;t) + 
x;t = 0; for all t  1
Uc;t    + (Uc;t    + Ucc;tct) = 0; for all t  0
vg;t       = 0; for all t  0;
where  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with (25). Note that ct and gt are constant for
all t  0, while xt is constant for all t  1 and may be dierent in the initial period. Call the
corresponding allocation fx0;x1;c;gg. Thus, we can write (25) as (Uc   )c   g + 
(x1) =
(1   )(x0)(1 + B0). Plug this expression into the period budget constraint (12) and we get
Bt =
(x0)(1+B0)
(x1)  1 for all t  1, i.e., debt is constant after the initial period. Thus, fx0;x1;c;gg
solves
(ux;0   f;0)   (vg   )x;0(1 + B0) = 0
(ux;1   f;t) + (vg   )
x;1 = 0
vg(Uc   ) + (vg   )Uccc = 0
(Uc   )c   g + 
(x1)   (1   )(x0)(1 + B0) = 0:











x = 0 (27)
v
g(U
c   ) + (v
g   )U
ccc = 0 (28)
(U
c   )c   g + 
(x)   (1   )(x)(1 + B) = 0: (29)
Equations (27) and (28) are identical to the MPME steady state conditions, (18) and (19),





x from (17), equations (26) and (29) are identical
to (18) and (20), respectively. Thus, given B0 = B, the solution to the Ramsey problem is
fBt = B;xt = x;ct = c;gt = gg for all t  0.
A.5 Proposition 4




x . From (9) it follows that  is also the same.
(ii) From (8), (11) and (17) we get  =

(x)













If two economies are distinct, but share the same 
(x), then (x) must be dierent, which
implies fB;;qg must be dierent as well.
(iii) Using the expressions derived above, if an economy has a lower (x) then B and 
are greater, while q is smaller.
B Monetary economies
B.1 Competitive Markets
Assume the day-market is competitive. A consumer faces a day-budget constraint, ~ px  m,
where ~ p is the|normalized|market price of good x. Using  as the Lagrange multiplier asso-
ciated with this constraint, the problem of a consumer can be written as
V c(m;b) = max
x
u(x) + W(0) +
(m + b   ~ px)
p(1   )
+ (m   ~ px):








The problem of a producer is
V p(m;b) = max

 f() + W(0) +
(m + b + ~ p)
p(1   )
:





The day market clearing condition is  = (1 )~ p, which, given x = (1 ), implies ~ p = 1
x.
Thus, the expression above and (7), imply (x)  fx. From the envelope conditions we get
V c
m = ux




(x)  x(ux   f).
28B.2 Financial intermediation
One important ineciency in the economy described above is due to the inability of producers in
the day to lend their idle cash balances. Thus, consider a monetary economy that resolves this
nancial friction by assuming the existence of a technology that record nancial transactions,
as suggested by Berentsen et al. (2007). Financial intermediation is conducted by perfectly
competitive banks, which accept nominal deposits and make nominal loans. Banks are endowed
with a technology that allows them to record nancial histories at zero cost. However, trading
histories cannot be recorded. Banks cannot issue their own notes, nor can they provide third-
party verication for government bonds in transactions between agents. Thus, money is still
used as the only medium of exchange in the day market. The added feature is that now, at
the beginning of each period, sellers can deposit their money holdings at banks, and buyers can
borrow money from banks. Deposits and loans mature at night. Perfect competition in the
banking sector implies that the deposit and loan interest rates are equal. Let i  0 be the bank
nominal interest rate. Assume perfect enforcement and no borrowing constraints in nancial
markets.
A consumer in the day market enters the period with m units of at money and b units of
government bonds. Being generally cash-constrained, he borrows ` units of at money from the
bank with the obligation to repay (1 + i)` units of money at night. The consumer then uses
m + ` to buy x goods at price ~ p. Thus, his starting nominal balances at night|net of loan
obligations|are equal to m + b   ~ px   i`. Using  as the Lagrange multiplier associated with
the budget constraint, the problem of a consumer is
V c(m;b) = max
x;`
u(x) + W(0) +
(m + b   ~ px   i`)
p(1   )
+ (m + `   ~ px):











Note that i = 0 if and only if  = 0.
A producer has no use for cash and thus, deposits his money holdings at the bank. If he
starts the period with m units of money and b units of government bonds, deposits d units of
money and sells  units of the day-good at price ~ p, his starting nominal balances at night|
including deposit claims|are m + b + ~ p + id. The problem of a producer can be written
as
V p(m;b) = max
;d
 f() + W(0) +
(m + b + ~ p + id)
p(1   )
+ d(m   d);
where d is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint that states that an agent








The second equation shows that producers deposit all their money holdings if i > 0. Without
loss of generality, assume that they also deposit all their money holdings when i = 0.
The market clearing conditions are ` = (1 )d and (1 )~ p = (1+`). The rst equation
states that the total amount of money borrowed from banks has to equal the total amount of
29money that was deposited at banks. The second equation states that the nominal value of total
output sold by producers has to equal total money holdings|including loans|of buyers. Note
that since producers deposit all their money holdings, d = 1 and thus, ` =
1 
 , which implies
(1   )~ p = 1. Using the day-resource constraint, x = (1   ), we get ~ p = 1
x. Thus, the













Consider the economy without nancial intermediation, but assume now that the day-good
is traded in a decentralized market. I abstract from search frictions, i.e., the possibility that
an agent does not meet someone with whom to trade in the day-market.12 Thus, let  = 1
2
and assume all agents in the day are matched in consumer-producer pairs. In these bilateral
meetings, consumers and producers bargain over the terms of trade: a quantity x and a monetary
transfer (normalized by the aggregate money stock) . Here, we need to make the additional
assumption u(0) = 0 to ensure the trading surplus is positive. In terms of the bargaining
problem, I follow the analysis in Aruoba et al. (2007) and adopt the proportional solution due
to Kalai (1977). Below, I also consider the Nash (1950) bargaining solution and show why it is
not suitable for policy analysis in this context.
Suppose the terms of trade agreed in a bilateral meeting are fx;g. A consumer that starts
the period with nominal holdings fm;bg gets u(x) + W(m    + b) = u(x) + W(0) +
(m+b )
p(1 ) ;
similarly, a producer starting with the same nominal holdings gets  f(x) + W(m +  + b) =
 f(x)+W(0)+
(m+b+)
p(1 ) . If no agreement is reached, both agents get W(m+b) = W(0)+
(m+b)
p(1 ) .
Given consumer's bargaining weight  2 (0;1] and consumer's money holdings m, the pro-
















. Following standard arguments, we can





where (x)  (1   )u(x) + f(x).
The terms of trade are not aected by the money holdings of a producer. Thus, V
p









@m). If a consumer brings
one more unit of money to the match, then x increases by 
p(1 )x and  goes up by 1. Thus,
we get V c
m =
(x)ux






12Note that this is a standard assumption when these type of models are calibrated.
30B.4 Nash bargaining














A monetary equilibrium under the Nash solution looks identical to the proportional solution
derived above, except for the expression for (x). With Nash, we get (x)  (1 (x))u(x)+
(x)f(x), where (x) = ux
ux+(1 )fx.
One feature of the Nash solution that sets it apart from all the other cases considered in
this paper, is that the function 
(x) crosses zero at some point below ^ x and hence, we cannot
guarantee that the non-negativity constraint, 
(x)  0, will not bind. In other words, it may
be possible that the equilibrium under the Nash solution features a zero nominal interest rate
for all levels of debt. When applying the calibration with the proportional solution (see Table
3) to the Nash bargaining case, we obtain 
(X(B)) = 0 for all B 2  . Increasing  to 0:999
resolves this issue but the steady state statistics are o target. When solving for parameter
values that calibrate the economy with the Nash bargaining solution to the U.S. economy, there
does not seem to be a solution. See Aruoba et al. (2007) for further analysis of the dierences
between the Nash and Kalai bargaining solutions in the Lagos-Wright framework, for the case
with exogenous government policy.
C Parameter-elasticities for Table 5
Competitive Markets Financial Intermediation Trading Frictions
                   
B(1+)
Y   0:55 0:69 1:82  0:38 2:22  0:13  0:43 0:47 0:80  0:22 2:69  0:21  0:50  0:72  0:32 13:07  0:19
  0:96 0:00 1:74  1:51 2:04 1:45  0:90 0:00 0:00  1:39 1:89 1:31  0:91  0:85  1:48 7:70 1:38
  0:55 0:00 0:00  0:09 0:00 0:73  0:54 0:00 0:00  0:05 0:00 0:71  0:54 0:00  0:11 0:00 0:73
pn
Y   0:55  0:06 0:00  0:15 0:00 0:83  0:51  0:10  0:16  0:10  0:10 0:85  0:54  0:02  0:17  0:15 0:83
pg
Y   0:51  0:06 0:00  0:07 0:00 0:77  0:47  0:10  0:16  0:03  0:10 0:79  0:50  0:02  0:10  0:15 0:77
D Numerical approximation of stochastic economies
The monetary economies with aggregate uncertainty are solved globally using a projection
method with the following algorithm:
(i) Dene a grid of N  points over  . The stochastic state space S is discretized in NS states,
using the method described in Tauchen (1986).13 Create the indexed functions Bi(B),
X i(B), Ci(B), and Gi(B), for i = f1;:::;NSg, and set an initial guess.
(ii) Construct the following system of equations: for every point in the debt and exogenous
state grids, evaluate equations (21)|(24). Since (22) contains X j(Bi(B)) (and its deriva-
tive) and Gj(Bi(B)), use cubic splines to interpolate between debt grid points and calculate
the derivatives of policy functions.
13See Flod en (2008) for a recent comparison with alternative methods.
31(iii) Use a non-linear equations solver to solve the system in (ii). There are N   NS  4
equations. The unknowns are the values of the policy function at the grid points. In each
step of the solver, the associated cubic splines need to be updated so that the interpolated
evaluations of future choices are consistent with each new guess.
We could alternatively simplify step (iii) by using value function iteration: simply solve the
maximization problem of the government at every grid point. Update the policy and value
functions and iterate until convergence is achieved. This method is simpler to implement, but
less precise. However, relative to the algorithm described above, it serves a dual purpose: rst, it
can be used to obtain a good initial guess for policy functions; and second, it provides a method
to verify the numerical approximation found using the rst-order conditions, as described above.
Each exogenous stochastic process is approximated by 7 discrete states, which implies NS =
49. For debt, I set NB = 10 and let   = [ 1:0;3:5]. There are a total of 196 functions to
solve. Given that the debt grid has 10 points, we have to solve a system of 1;960 equations.
To measure the precision of the solution, I create a debt grid of 1;000 points for  , evaluate
(21)|(24) for all these debt points and all s 2 S, and sum the squared residuals. For the
case with competitive markets, the sum of squared residuals for each equation are, respectively:
2e 11, 2e 14, 3e 12 and 3e 13. The other two cases feature similar degrees of precision.
Finally, we need to construct measures of real GDP and the in
ation rate. In the model,
real GDP is measured using the non-stochastic steady state as the base period for prices. Thus,
let yt = ln(~ pxt + p(ct + gt)) be the measure of log real GDP in the articial economy and let
dyt be log real GDP in period t minus its sample average. To calculate the in
ation rate, dene
the aggregate (normalized) price level P as the weighted average of prices in the day and night
markets. I.e., for any period t, let Pt  sD~ pt + sNpt, where sD and sN are the expenditure
shares for the day and night markets, respectively. Expenditure shares are constructed using
the non-stochastic steady state statistics as the base period: sD 
~ px




ation rate is dened as: t 
Pt(1+t 1)
Pt 1   1.
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34Figure 3: Money demand

























































35Figure 4: Phillips curve
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